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that channels ‘anti-authoritarian, subversive energies’,
especially against the security apparatus of the Chinese
state. Are there similar tensions to unpick here? And if
we can see jugaad in rural Chinese washing machines,
what might shanzhai look like in India?
Jugaad Time’s provocations are not limited to its
philosophical reflections and fieldwork notes, but are
found also in the speculative interludes that pepper the
book. Rai’s Fables of the Reinvention, a gripping vision
of ‘mutating technoperceptual assemblages’ and ‘data
reinventing life’ reads like a new frontier for Indian sci-
ence fiction. But dystopias are not distant from the
present moment. I finished reading Jugaad Time on a
flight, where I’d also picked up an international edition
of the New York Times. In this 19 December 2019 edition,
the third page featured a story entitled ‘India’s habit of
shutting down the internet’. India, it reads, ‘tops the
world – by far – in the number of Internet shutdowns im-
posed by local, state and national governments.’ Over the
previous calendar year therewere 134 cuts to internet ser-
vice, justified largely as a method to secure order against
‘misinformation’, but also deployed for more mundane
reasons, such as to prevent students from cheating on
exams. Pakistan, India’s closest competitor, had cut ser-
vice 12 times; Syria and Turkey just once. This story,
alongside the sustained internet and communications
blackout imposed in Kashmir since August 2019, under-
lines Rai’s concern about the increasingly authoritarian
character of the Indian state’s engagement with smart
technologies. If the futures promised by jugaad are mul-
tiple and contradictory, then its affirmation of the plasti-
city of the present must be seized upon with strategy and
intent, affirming with Rai ‘the potential of strategic bot-
tlenecks, sabotage and repurposing … to effect change
in contemporary arrangements and practices of solidar-
ity’, not least at this time of toxicity, entanglement and
reinvention.
ChrisMoffat
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Over the past few decades, various critical scholars have
emphasised the limitations of human rights. Such schol-
ars have, for the most part, proposed a return to human
rights as the solution to its failures, hoping to revise the
project through a renewed faith in liberal democratic
values, as, for example, in scholarship by Wendy Brown,
Costas Douzinas or David Kennedy. In Gender, Alterity
and Human Rights: Freedom in a Fishbowl, Ratna Kapur
also notes the uses, promises and limitations of the hu-
man rights project. However, rather than returning to the
latter for answers to these limitations,Kapur goes further,
seeking to think freedom through alternative registers
beyond the bounds of the liberal legal fishbowl. The book
is consequently essential reading for international law-
yers, human rights lawyers and activists, and for critical
thinkers across the disciplines, drawing on postcolonial,
intersectional, feminist and queer theory, epistemologies
of the global south and relationships between theory, act-
ivism and spirituality to provide a unique and in-depth
analysis of the search for freedom beyond dominant sys-
tems of knowledge.
Much contemporary human rights scholarship can
be seen as resting somewhere between a more doctrinal
approach, seeking to use human rights law for social
justice gains, and a more critical approach, which aims to
understand what social justice outcomes are not seen by
current human rights framings. Thus,while critical schol-
ars note the ways in which human rights have become
a powerful tool for governance with not always positive
outcomes, people working more on the doctrinal side
often hear this as a dismissal of their work and, in turn,
dismiss critical perspectives for failing to offer practical
solutions. While these two approaches tend to be set up
in antithesis to one another, problematically equating,
as Kapur states, ‘a liberal rights critique with pessimism,
and a liberal rights deployment with optimism’, there
are convergences as well as serious differences between
them. Both, after all, want some form of social justice or
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freedom, to use Kapur’s terminology.
The fissure between these theories is often largest,
however, at the ideological level. Terms such as freedom
and justice are defined in very different ways by each,
with more doctrinal approaches tending to define free-
dom and justice in liberal legal terms and more critical
approaches seeking to define these terms beyond domin-
ant liberal frames. Human rights lawyers and activists
often demand answers to what they can do on the ground,
but such answers, as Kapur’s book outlines with detail
and nuance, are not always easily provided or are some-
times more complex than expected when one seeks to
understand freedom beyond the liberal legal fishbowl.
This, however, does not mean that critical approaches
cannot also be affirmative.
Human rights law can, indeed, provide a moment of
freedom or justice for many. But human rights law does
not fundamentally challenge or, arguably, even seek to
challenge structural injustices as created by colonialism
and racism, patriarchy or capitalism. As Kapur notes,
this has long been highlighted by feminist and postco-
lonial scholarship. Rather, human rights largely work
within these systems of power and domination, often
upholding such systems while offering ‘a potent form
of seduction into a particular type of normativity and
a specific mode of governance’; a form of what Lauren
Berlant terms ‘cruel optimism’.
While human rights can and have been used for more
transformational projects and while their impact does
sometimes trickle out beyond the case at hand, human
rights generally seek to address individual rights as isol-
ated from broader power structures. There are, of course,
some exceptions and some attempts to provide a more
radical human rights-based approach. Nonetheless, the
transformative project of human rights is often unclear,
with the vast majority of human rights scholarship re-
maining tethered, as Kapur outlines, to a limited liberal
account of freedom which reproduces the ‘neoliberal,
wealth-producing, heteronormative, reproductive frame-
work, as well as … [its] sexual, cultural, racial and reli-
gious prescriptions’.
On the other hand, critical approaches are much
clearer in their transformative aims. For many critical
scholars, such as Kapur, freedom must also be sought
beyond the limits of the law. Freedom is not just about
balancing people’s human rights against one another to
provide liberal equality. Rather, freedom requires dis-
mantling gender hierarchies, decolonising knowledge
and power and challenging dominant epistemologies.
Freedom cannot be sought within the neoliberal frame.
Moreover, as Kapur uniquely adds, freedom is also about
spirituality and about the search beyond anything the law
can – at least as it is currently envisaged – comprehend.
This does not, as Kapur notes, mean that the terrain
gained by human rights advocacy should be surrendered,
but, rather, that what is needed is ‘a more mindful and
diligent approach’.
Gender, Alterity and Human Rights begins with an
analysis of a few key examples of the inclusions and ex-
clusions created by the human rights project, drawing on
examples such as queer homonormativity (Chapter Two)
and sexual security regimes (Chapter Three). In these
analyses, Kapur focuses on the regulation of gender and
sexuality, drawing on postcolonial, feminist and queer
analyses to show that, while some have been slowly more
included into the human rights frame,many are still very
much excluded. One example Kapur discusses, in this
vein, is the debate over the veil (Chapter Four). Many
116
feminists have advocated for the legal banning of the
veil, arguing that this piece of clothing is a symbol of
women’s oppression. Cases then challenging legal bans
have subsequently been brought to the European Court
of Human Rights which has upheld such bans. (See Dakir
v Belgium, 2017; Sahin v Turkey, 2005; S.A.S. v France,
2014.)
While, as noted, the bans are often articulated in
terms of women’s rights, this perspective silences the
many meanings of the veil. The veil is imposed on some
but the veil is also worn by many by choice and, as Saba
Mahmood’s Politics of Piety (2004) explores, can itself be
a symbol of freedom. The veil legal cases and the wider
debates on the veil and women’s human rights exemplify
how human rights, despite claiming to be promoting the
universal rights of all, include some and exclude oth-
ers. These lines of inclusion and exclusion are, as Kapur
notes, drawn in a way that is based around colonial and
racist lines and the idea that Muslim women have no
agency. ‘Muslims’, Kapur thus notes, ‘continue to be con-
ceptualised as the embodiment of a threatening alterity,
and always as incommensurable with the liberal values
which are the substrate of human rights discourse’. Un-
veiling becomes a form of governance, excluding some
from the universal humanity that human rights claim to
promote, while forcing others to submit in order to be
able to access the ‘freedom’ that human rights prescribes
them.
Kapur does not deny that human rights have been
used as an emancipatory tool for some but refuses to side-
line the excluded in the name of those included, calling
for those working in human rights to note these inclu-
sions and exclusions and to challenge them. Yet Kapur’s
project does not end here. Gender, Alterity and Human
Rights also provides another layer of analysis which notes
the inclusions and exclusions provided by the epistemo-
logical framing of human rights itself, questioning the
ability of human rights to ever fully include, to ever be
universal, let alone to provide freedom. While, arguably,
human rights were never meant to provide ultimate free-
dom, they do claim universality and, as one of the most
dominant discourses on social justice in the contempor-
ary moment, human rights have come to be understood
as the main frame of freedom in many parts of the world.
This is problematic, working to exclude alternative per-
spectives. It is thus paramount that that which is not
seen by human rights is made visible.
Kapur notes the difficulty of conceptualising freedom
beyond the given terms ‘when we remain intractably con-
stituted through a specific epistemological universe …
[w]hen we are [and have been] so fully colonised into a
specific way of thinking’. Parallels can be drawn here,
as she acknowledges, with Judith Butler’s reflections on
power in The Psychic Life of Power (1997), where, reading
Foucault and others, Butler notes the cultural and polit-
ical predicament of ‘how to take an oppositional relation
to power that is, admittedly, implicated in the very power
one opposes’.
This predicament is complex but many authors, in-
cluding Kapur, offer varying ways out. Kapur sits here
alongside authors such as Joan Wallach Scott who, in
works including The Fantasy of Feminist History (2012),
draws on psychoanalytic theory to identify a potential for
radical change in fantasy. For Scott,while the concepts of
the symbolic order ‘provide the language through which
identities are formed, the unconscious foundations on
which social practises are implemented … fantasy en-
ables challenge and change’.
What brings these more hopeful critical voices to-
gether is a willingness to see beyond binary thinking.
Such perspectives do not see structural forms of oppres-
sion as fixed, but rather focus on the power of the subject
in fostering change. Butler’s solution, too, exemplifies
this, noting how the fact that ‘agency is implicated in
subordination is not the sign of a fatal self-contradiction’,
but rather that such a reflection requires complex per-
spectives which note the subject’s implication within
power as ‘neither fully determined by power nor fully
determining of power’. Complexity is, in this respect,
a positive source for change, noting and holding the
contradictions together, being unafraid, in the words
of Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto, of ‘contradictory
standpoints’, searching beyond what is known while be-
ing attentive to the constraints of the now.
Kapur’s contribution draws similar lines of post-
dualistic flight while also – in a similar vein to Scott
– seeking an affirmative focus through affect and the
politics of the everyday, highlighting the ‘relationship
between the self’ and the ‘turn inwards’ as a way in which
freedom can be sought beyond liberal registers. Kapur
begins her journey into these non-liberal registers of
freedom through a focus on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s and
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Michel Foucault’s works on Mahayana Buddhism and
the Shia Islam underpinnings of the Iranian revolution
respectively (Chapter 6). Noting Sedgwick’s lamenting
of the paranoia and the ultimate ‘intellectual finitude’
of critical theory, yet her love of deconstruction, Kapur
discusses how she found an affirmative epistemology
of non-dualism in Mahayana Buddhism. In a similar
vein, Kapur discusses how Foucault, drawing on Shia Is-
lam, turned away from the binaries underpinning the
sovereign subject and the state (e.g. mind/body, pub-
lic/private), looking instead towards ‘another political
thought, another political imagination’ and noting the
need for the transformation of the self. Kapur similarly
draws on non-dualism and the turn to the self in her
own exploration of freedom beyond the liberal fishbowl.
Here, she looks primarily to the tradition of non-dualism
found in the Indian philosophy of Advaita, which focuses
on being and the self, seeing the self ‘as one not a frag-
mented whole – who ultimately is not defined by her
labels or identities’. Freedom, from this perspective, is
not a project to be sought elsewhere but necessitates
self-inquiry.
Kapur’s turn to non-dualism and self-inquiry poses a
radical challenge to the liberal frame of freedomprovided
by human rights. As Kapur notes, such a proposition calls
on one to look inwards before seeking to ‘save’ others,
noting the difficulty with being able to ‘theorise and/or
even actualise freedom for others before we have suc-
cessfully freed ourselves from our own deep condition-
ing, unmitigated phobias, discriminatory schemas and
powerful sense of privilege and entitlement’. While this
move could be seen as similar to and indeed has links
with other critical human rights scholars, Kapur’s point is
also much stronger, calling not just for further reflection
before one acts but asking the actor to seek to under-
stand freedom for themselves first, and subsequently to
challenge the internalised normative frame of freedom
offered by the liberal human rights project before seeking
to save others.
Gender, Alterity and Human Rights ends with four
examples of those who have sought freedom beyond lib-
eral frames, exemplifying the inward journey required to
truly seek freedom. Some of these stories, while requir-
ing the reader to radically challenge their own thinking
and assumptions around freedom, seem quite removed
from human rights, so exemplifying the radical epistemic
shift that Kapur calls for. For example, one such story is
of Lalla, a fourteenth-century Kashmiri woman who re-
nounced marriage and material life and wandered naked
while undertaking a process of self-reflection and med-
itation through, in part, a turn to mystic poetry. Some
examples, however, more easily pose challenges to hu-
man rights frameworks, such as the example of the legal
battles around the Jain community’s practice of con-
scious fasting known as Santhara or Sullekhna. Kapur
notes how this spiritual practice is ‘conscious and in-
formed, grounded in the epistemological view shared by
Hindus, Buddhists and Jains that the self/consciousness
continues after it is released from the corporeal form’.
Nonetheless, this practice has been ruled illegal in India,
with parties having argued, first, that the practice is of-
ten used against ‘elderly women considered economically
burdensome’ and, second, that the practise is in violation
of the right to life (the act being likened to suicide, which
was made criminal under Indian law by Christian British
colonial rulers). As Kapur notes, such an understanding
of the practise ignores ‘deeper philosophical aspects’. By
‘confining the issue within a rights paradigm’, the altern-
ative registers of freedom sought through this practice
are both silenced and denied.
Gender, Alterity and Human Rights is a bold book, un-
afraid to address the importance of the spiritual in an era
where much critical scholarship either shies away from
spirituality for fear of being deemed anti-secular or more
actively and problematically takes secularism as an in-
herent underlying basis of good critical work. Further to
this, Kapur requires her reader to reflect on their own per-
spective on life, to challenge their own understandings
of freedom and to think on the self and what freedom
means to that self. Ultimately, the book provides an af-
firmative way of thinking freedom at a time in global
politics where it has become all too easy to collapse into
negativity and nihilism.
Emily Jones
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